Đang Minh Han
Major
– general Pham Hoai Chuong, former commander of the people’s armed forces
of Binh Thuan province, wrote the following lines in his memoirs: “About
in June 1952, comrade Le Duan, on his way to the North for a meeting,
stopped in the Binh Thuan to the work with the officials of the
Southernmost part of central Viet Nam and of the provincial Party
committee. He gave many important comments on the very effective special
mission combat tactics in the eastern region of South - Viet Nam. At the
request of the Binh Thuan province military command, comrade Le Duan,
before continuing his trip to the north for a meeting, left behind three
comrades: Nguyen Hieu Liem, company leader, and two special mission
combatants Tran Thang Ne and Nguyen Huu Doi, group leaders after these
three comrades had held an initial two-month special mission combat
training course, 43 officers and soldiers of regiment, 812 led by platoon
leader Le Van Luyen rapidly acquired the special mission technique and
tactics. This enabled our forces to win very difficult battles, to destroy
or force many blockhouses to surrender, overrun the posts of Nga Hai, Song
Quao, Muong Man, Mui Ne, Song Can, Pascal, Lien Thanh hotel (Phan Thiet),
and this special mission tactics spread to the battles against the
Americans, and enabled us to vanquish them…”
Especially in the
brilliant battle on 18.9.1952 at Nga Hai post (Phan Thiet) led by Nguyen
Minh Chau (who was then commander of Binh Thuan military forces; he would
be a major- general and recently died in Ho Chi Minh City). Our special
mission combatants used blasting charges to destroy blockhouses, redoubts,
houses of soldiers and officers, at that same time our troops penetrated
into the post to kill the enemy. Attacked by surprise, the enemies were
totally paralyzed.
The battle on Song Quao
sector in the night of 18.01.1953 was led by Nguyen Chi Dien and Nguyen
Lenh (regiment leader and political adviser of regiment 812; comrade
Nguyen Chi Dien would be later the first commander of the special mission
army branch) They worked in coordination with Quach Tu Hap and Le Van
Khue, who led directly a special mission platoon and an assault company.
After 30 minutes of combat, we destroyed a company and captured 30 enemies
(3 Frenchmen were among them), a Vicker heavy machine gun, 9 machine guns,
18 light machine guns, 120 rifles, a 81mm mortar. We had one combatant
killed and 3 wounded. With hundreds of victories, regiment 812 was two
times conferred the title of hero – regiment of the people’s armed forces
by the National assembly and the government the history of regiment 812
was deeply marked by the motto:
“WITH THE ADOPTION OF
THE SOUTH-VIET NAM SPECIAL MISSION TACTICS, WE WIN BRILLIANT VICTORIES”
Major-general Pham Hoai
Chuong, officers and soldiers of regiment 812 knew only that the special
mission tactics originated in South-Viet Nam, they did not know who
invented this wonderful combat warfare. I tried to know about the
background of the man who had the merit to create this special mission
combat, an original fighting method appropriate with warfare using small
forces against the enemy and winning big victories. It required only one
thing, that our soldiers had to be courageous, brave and master the
technique well. Only nearly twenty years later, in the years of the
anti-American war did I meet many officers who knew the man I want to look
for. These officers, on their way from war zone D to R base, stopped at
unit 770, where I was in charge of the propaganda and training section and
told me stories about this man. As I wanted to know well about his
background, I carefully noted down their stories, especially the comments
and opinions of Tu Khanh (i.e major-general Dao Son Tay) about the brave
and creative fighting example of Hai Ca, who invented the special mission
tactics for the time in the eastern region of South-Viet Nam.
More than thirty years
had elapsed since that date and during that period. I heard of many great
resounding victories which terrified the enemy, victories known not only
to the Vietnamese people, but also to the whole world. In the brilliant
victory won by our armed forces and our people which led to the liberation
of the South and the national reunification, we were proud to have a new
army branch, “the special mission army, which presently occupies a
deserving position, recognized by the Party as an important army branch in
our armed forces beside infantry, artillery and other army branches”.
(General Vo Nguyen Giap’s speech on the day of formation of the special
mission army 19.03.1967).
To look for more
detailed and accurate materials, I contacted many fellow-combatants of Hai
Ca, alias Tran Cong An and Hai Ca himself, who sincerely recounted his
stories to me at that request of the Veterans’ Association and the
Literature and Fine-Arts Association of Dong Nai province, after he had
been conferred the title of Hero of the People’s Armed Forces on
23.10.1996 by the State President. I referred to the book”. History of
Dong Nai armed forces”, and especially a statement of the special mission
army command which recognized that “Comrade Tran Cong An organized the Tan
Uyen guerrilla group and trained them to attack the blockhouse at Ba Kien
bridge in the beginning of 1948…”. Animated by the wish I had nurtured for
nearly half a century, I enthusiastically recorded facts about the special
mission combats of Hai Ca in Bien Hoa, Dong Nai.
In the beginning of
1948, after the enemy had suffered heavy defeats in all battle-fields of
our three regions, they barbarously took revenge by massacring, destroying
and setting fire to houses and oppressing people. They abandoned their
lighting war and quick victory strategy to adopt a long term war strategy
implementing the policy of “using war to feed war and using Vietnamese
soldiers to kill Vietnamese people’, pacifying occupied areas to trespass
spread free zones. In the eastern region of South Viet Nam, they adopted
the tactics of De Latour by building thousands of posts and blockhouses on
roads, along road 16 from Tan Ba to Tan Uyen town, to Phuoc Hoa rubber
plantation, along road 24 from Cay Dao to Rach Dong. Blockhouses were also
built thickly on national routes 13,14,1,15 and provincial road 24. Their
De Latour tactics aimed at protecting their communication ways,
intercepting liaison ways on land of the resistance, at the same time
using their blockhouse system as a spreading means and controlling our
guerrilla areas and bases.
Each blockhouse was
built very solidly, of square shape, the sides of which measured 4 to 5
meters. The walls were 0.5 to 0.8 meter thick, 8 to 10 meters high, made
of stones or bricks. Each blockhouse was guarded by half a group. The
blockhouse was surrounded by a thick earthen rampart having loop-holes.
Outside, there were a trench planted with spikes and mines, barbed wires,
dogs and geese. The blockhouses were one kilometer apart and could send
signals to each other for help. In each group of 6 or 7 blockhouses there
was a main blockhouse forming a system of mutual reinforcement in case of
attack by our troops. The main blockhouse was 10 to 12 meters high and
guarded by a group. Each blockhouse was equipped with a strong fire power,
transmission machines and other necessary activity means. The system of
blockhouses of the French colonialists caused many difficulties to the
resistance, especially to our communication and liaison on land. The
blockhouse walls were thick, and in the eastern region of South Viet Nam
there were no weapons to demolish walls from far. The command of war zone
7 determined that the demolition of blockhouses, the victory over De
Latour tactics was an important task for the eastern region armed forces.
This task was disseminated to all the armed forces in war zone 7,
including Bien Hoa provincial armed forces.
Although the task was
extremely difficult and complex, when Tran Van Kia (alias Tran Cong An)
received an order from the Tan Uyen district armed forces command to
destroy the blockhouse at Ba Kien bridge to get experience for subsequent
attacks on blockhouses, Tran Cong An made a mock blockhouse (As he thought
that the blockhouse was well defended by the enemy, in order to attack it
our guerrillas had to stealthily approached the foot of its walls. So he
chose an isolated tree in the base to represent the blockhouse. Around the
tree there were barbed wire fences. Guerrillas having their nude torsos
smeared with a home-made camouflaging liquid stealthily crawled over the
fences, climbed the mock blockhouse (i.e the tree), then threw mock
grenade… The exercises were very elaborate, but the hero of the heroic war
zone D enthusiastically accepted the task of leading a group of guerrillas
to attack the blockhouse at Bien Hoa bridge on road 16, My Chanh hamlet,
Phuoc Thanh village, Tan Uyen district (Bien Hoa).
This difficult task was
entrusted to the group of guerrillas led by Tran Cong An.
The greatest difficulty
at that time was that we did not have any weapon to demolish the walls of
this solid blockhouse to vanquish the enemy we had first to use ruse and
bravery associated with improve weapons to boldly attack the enemy and
defeat them to revenge our dear compatriots. In order to destroy this
blockhouse and win a first victory Tran Cong An had to make elaborate
studies based on the information supplied by our secret agents about the
structure and defence system of the blockhouse, the activity routine and
negligences of the enemy. Tran Cong An imposed a hard training upon his
group. He chose an isolated tree in the base to represent the blockhouse.
A guerrilla sitting in
the tree lighted the ground with his battery lamp while other guerrillas
having their nude torsos smeared with liquid mud endeavoured to approach
the tree foot. They repeated this exercise until the man in the tree could
not discover their approach with his battery lamp. After many nights of
study, Tran Cong An noticed that the enemy soldiers made the negligence of
smoking after they had lighted the ground with their projectors of after
each watch shift. After each study and investigation, he discussed with
his group, drew appropriate experience and carried out more exercises to
ensure that the man in the tree did not discover the approaching
guerrillas, that the camouflage matched the colour of surrounding earth
and grass. Even if the guerrillas did not timely shut their eyes when the
enemy turned on their projectors, they would discover the guerrillas at
once. The group was committed to win the first battle.
After the exercises had
been satisfactory, the group drew up an attack plan and submitted it to
the Tan Uyen district militia section, which sent two groups for
reinforcement. In the night of 18.03.1948, Tran Cong An led a group
consisting of two Tan Uyen district guerrillas named Tran Van Nguyen and
Ho Van Lung. The group stealthily penetrated into the blockhouse premises
with the help of two watchers, guerrillas Nguyen Van A and secret agent
Tran Van Hoi. Thanks to good camouflage and the surprise factor, the three
combatants crawled and approached the target easily a ladder with them.
According to their assigned task, Nguyen rapidly climbed the ladder up to
the highest floor, Lung climbed to the middle floor and Tran Cong An
stayed at the ground floor to carry out the combat and give orders the
three of then simultaneously threw three grenades through the loop-holes.
Tran Cong An, thinking that the enemy still survived, climbed to the
middle floor and threw a more grenade. He thought it was a dud grenade,
suddenly it exploded and he fell on the ground, wounded. Nguyen and Lung
having collected the weapons and cleaned up the battle-field, carried An
home and bandaged him. In this battle, we killed 11 enemies, captured 8
rifles and 20 grenades.
After the victorious attack on the blockhouse at Ba Kien bridge, the
provincial military committee and the Tan Uyen district military committee
made this analysis: “The battle at Ba Kien bridge opened a new warfare
based on the people, a good knowledge of the enemy’s situation, a good
knowledge of the target and the enemy’s defence system, using only a small
force against a numerically superior force of the enemy. With a strong
fighting will, bravery and ruse, we attacked the enemy by surprise and
they did have no time to respond. This experience enabled us to destroy
many enemy’s posts in many places in the eastern region of South Viet
Nam”. The Thu
Bien province military committee launched an emulation campaign for all
the militia and guerrillas of the province to study and carry out this
warfare.
For the victory of Ba
Kien bridge battle, the guerrilla group and Tran Cong An received a
citation from the command of military zone 7 and commendations from the
Bien Hoa province military committee and the Tan Uyen district military
committee. But the greatest honour for Tran Cong An, at 28 years of age,
was that he was admitted to the Party on 07.05.1948 for his brilliant
achievement. At the allegiance ceremony, before the Party flag and the
portrait of beloved and respectable Uncle Ho, he swore “to fight all his
life for the Party aims and ideal to place the fatherland’s interest above
individual interest”. He has kept this oath faithfully to this date.
In October 1949, the
enemy continued to implement De Latour’s campaign aiming at controlling,
tightening their encircling, mopping-up and isolating our bases to a
higher degree; they built soldier defence works, blockhouses and posts,
increased their forces, surrounded posts with more barbed wire fences,
planted mines, used dogs, chickens, ducks, geese, cans, bells…, causing
more difficulties to us. But all these measures did not overcome the
steadfastness of Tran Cong An and the villagers of Thanh Phuoc, Thanh Hoi,
Tan Uyen (war zone D) and their intense hatred for the French invaders and
the traitors to their fatherland. Being a poor peasant, Tran Cong An hated
the French enemy who pillaged villagers’ assets. They had broken his
mother’s right arm with a bullet. He decided to kill the enemy to revenge
his family and his fellow-villagers. He trained day and night, studied
fighting methods which would enable him to fell Frenchmen who were much
bigger than him. Then, he learned that French soldiers searched the
village to capture pigs, chickens and ducks and raped women at Thanh Hoi.
On this day, morning (24.12.1946), unlike other times, a French soldier
went to Thanh Hoi from Tan Ba post. Tran Cong An secretly and unexpectedly
went behind the enemy, seized his legs, felled him on the ground, tied him
with a cord, then took an English rifle and 200 bullets from him. He sent
his trophy to the Tan Uyen district military committee. Although his deed
was adventurous since his parents lived in an occupied zone near Tan Ba
post, he still accomplished it thanks to the fact that he kept the secrecy
factor well and he was helped by the villagers who believed in the
revolution. So, he began his combat against the French by felling a
Frenchman with unarmed hands and capturing the enemy’s weapon. At the
beginning of the resistance war, a gun captured from the enemy was very
valuable.
In September 1946, Tran
Cong An joined unit 10 after a training course. Huynh Van Nghe, the unit
leader, charged An to build the self-defence militia for Tan Uyen
district. He applied this intelligent and brave warfare to the first
attack on a blockhouse, as mentioned above. In November 1949, the command
of military zone 7 held a conference on the blockhouse attack them . At
this conference, Tran Cong An made a report on his blockhouse attack
experience to representatives of the main forces, provincial and district
military committee, military ateliers, militia and guerrilla forces in the
zone. The command of military zone 7 conclude: We could attack blockhouses
successfully on the condition that study and investigation secretly and
that we had to have powerful destruction weapons to destroy blockhouses.
To implement the
military zone command’s order, the Bien Hoa provincial military committee
organized 50 groups of 300 skilful guerrillas trained by Bui Cat Vu and
Tran Cong An. After the training course and after the 50 groups of
guerrillas tested their mines well, the Bien Hoa military committee, in
the night of 21.03.1950, decided to carry out attacks on 50 blockhouses
located along roads 15, 16, 24 and national route 1. The walls of the 50
blockhouses were not demolished, our weapons made only 0.6 meter holes on
the walls, only the soldiers who slept in the blockhouses died. A
surviving soldier on the upper floor used his gun and grenades to resist
us. After this defeat, we studied the action of weapons again.
Simultaneously with exercises of blockhouse attack, the command of
military zone 7 ordered the military atelier to study and manufacture
weapons which would demolish thick walls. Bui Cat Vu and Dang Sy Hung were
mainly responsible for manufacturing a kind of concave mine (called FT and
petard). The test battle with two mines FT and petard was carried out in
the night of 18.04.1950 by the guerrillas of Tan Uyen led by Tran Cong An
and Bui Cat Vu. Our forces penetrated into main blockhouse at Ba Kien
bridge on road 16 for the second time and demolished its walls we killed
16 soldiers in the blockhouse and took all the weapons and ammunition.
In this second battle
on the main blockhouse at Ba Kien bridge, although the enemy’s defence
system was stronger, we vanquished them by using an original method. Tran
Cong An and the combatants in Nguyen Van Nghia’s unit attached at FT at
the end of a 2-meter long pole, put it close to the blockhouse wall and
made it explode, then they poked a petard into the blockhouse and made it
explode, this second explosion demolished the enemy’s stronghold. Our
purpose was to disseminate propaganda tracts to lead the enemy into error
that we had long range powerful artillery which could hit targets in order
to demoralize them. Indeed, after this battle, hundreds of enemy soldiers
deserted and returned to their civilian lives. The puppet administration
employees and spies who oppressed the people were terrified. We must
acknowledge that military atelier 310 under Bui Cat Vu (who would be a
major-general) made an important contribution to this second victory on
the main blockhouse at Ba Kien bridge. We atelier, lacking explosives,
sent its men everywhere to look for dud bombs, dropped by the enemy, saw
them to have explosives. Bui Cat Vu after long studies manufactured FTs
with electric detonators to demolish walls. At first FTs were big, it was
difficulty to keep them secret, to introduce them through fences and
obstacles. Later, engineer Le Hien, who had made studies in French and was
working at the weapons department of military zone 9, modified FTs on the
principle of concave shells, fitted with electric detonators and having
high destruction power. An FT was attached to a handle for attacking a
blockhouse surrounded by fences. The invention of FTs enabled Tran Cong
An’s special mission warfare to become more powerful and more effective.
Then, in the night
of25.04.1950, Tran Cong An led his unit to attack and demolish a main
blockhouse of Vam Gia on road 14. This blockhouse controlled the entrance
to war zone D, intercepted our supply routes and the vital relationship
between our armed forces and our civilian population in the whole country.
In this battle, we destroyed an entire platoon of legionnaires, captured
an 81 mortar, a 12.7 mm heavy machine gun and many tons of food and
foodstuffs. After the victory of Ba Kien blockhouse and Vam Gia
blockhouse, the armed forces in the eastern region of South Viet Nam could
affirm that the special mission warfare was really reliable, effective and
practical. In implementation of an order from the command of military zone
7, the Thu Bien province military committee organized first training
courses in special mission attack on blockhouse at Sinh, Ba Da (war zone
D) attended by nearly 100 guerrillas from Bien Hoa, Thu Dau Mot and Gia
Dinh. On the other hand, Tran Cong An was charged by military zone 7 and
the Thu Bien province military committee with the mission of disseminating
the experience of blockhouse secret surprise attack by two persons only,
one to place the FT and the other to operate the electric switch after the
first person had left the blockhouse. He organized blockhouse attack
warfare courses in My Tho (Tien Giang), Ba Ria… theoretical lessons were
followed at one by practice. Not only on the battle-field in the eastern
region of South Viet Nam, this warfare was studied and practiced in
surrounding provinces, then nationwide. The blockhouse attack technique
was studied, analysed by armed forces everywhere to draw experience, teach
it and apply it to attacks on posts, blockhouses, stores, bridges, roads
and important bases of the enemy. Reports of successive victories on the
whole national territory rejoiced everybody. The brilliant and great
victories in Quang Nam, Da Nang, Khanh Hoa, Tri Thien, Ca Mau, Quy Nhon,
Tay Ninh, Can Gio, Gia Dinh, Tay Nguyen, Song Be, Bien Hoa, Long Khanh,
Can tho, bent re, Binh Thuan…were due to the special mission warfare
carried out in coordination with other army branches.
I (the writer of this
article) myself was a soldier attending a military-political course at
Ngang war zone, I had the honour of studying and practicing that
blockhouse attack tactics. Thanks to experience of blockhouse attacks in
South Viet Nam, regiment 812, since 1952 , attacked many posts,
blockhouses and bases of the enemy at Duong, Phan Ri, Hoa Da, Tuy Phong,
Ma Lam, Phan Thiet, EC Pic camp… It was true that the regiment won all its
battles, everywhere I heard that victories were due to secret and surprise
attacks, clinging closely to the enemy, introducing explosives into
loop-holes, using small forces against numerically superior forces of the
enemy, but above all thanks to intelligence and bravery.
Thanks to this
effective combat method, Uncle Ho in this directive on the day of
formation of the Special Mission army branch (19.03.1967), said: “Dac Cong
means special mission, so it deserves special honour and needs to make
special efforts”. From that date there was the special mission army. Uncle
Ho meant “Special attack” or “Skilful special army”. Uncle Ho also
dedicated four verses to the special mission army on 19.03.1967, when he,
prime minister Pham Van Dong and general Vo Nguyen Giap paid a visit to
this army branch.
“Specially skilful,
Wonderfully brave,
Intelligent and bold,
Difficult battles win
great victories”.
After De Latour’s
tactics heavy failure, we opened many vital communication ways, had
convenient supply and safety corridors for the resistance war, at the same
time the enemy clearly decreased their mopping-up operations. These war
deeds originated from war zone D (Bien Hoa) and the person who initiated
these famous exploits by using the special mission warfare to defeat De
Latour’s tactics was Tran Cong An, a child of Bien Hoa-Dong Nai homeland.
Tran Cong An did not
only have the first merit of inventing the special mission welfare, he
also personally disseminated it by his realistic actions. Demonstrating
theory by practice, he always gave to his comrades and fellow combatants
detailed information on his combat experience which he had acquired by
participating together with his fellow combatants in victories won over
the enemy in B aria, Thu Duc, My Tho on An Chu main blockhouse, where we
captured 12 guns, 1 rocket, killed 25 French soldiers and Vietnamese
soldiers, in the communication battle on road 14 and in other blockhouse
attacks. In My Tho province, our victory won over the electricity house
post rejoiced the local residents very much. In coordination with commando
units, guerrillas destroyed two blockhouses in Trang Bom town, helped the
residents do way with anti-revolutionary reactionaries, made propaganda
for the population living in occupied zones to support the revolution.
The independence
special mission tactics developed soon into battles carried out in
coordination with commandos, infantry units…
On 16.06.1951, the Thu
Bien special forces in coordination with Lam Son company destroyed Long
Dien post (Phuoc Tan village), captured 3 machine guns, 3 light machine
guns, one 81mm mortar and 43 rifles. On 20.07.1951, the unit applied the
special mission tactics to its attack on Trang Bom important sector
(presently in Thong Nhat district, Dong Nai), killing 50 European-African
soldiers, capturing 50 Europeans and Africans, took 200 guns of all kinds,
4 heavy machine guns, 10 machine guns, one 81 mortar…
In the beginning of
1952, by order from the Thu Bien province military committee, Tran Cong An
returned to the staff bureau in preparation for a 6-month course on
guerrilla war in the North. Before his departure, Nguyen Quang Viet,
secretary of the provincial party committee and Huynh Van Nghe, commander
of the provincial armed forces made this appraisal: “Comrade Tran Cong An
is an officer from the base. He is very active, creator of the initial
special mission warfare, has contributed to build high quality and
effective self-defence militia forces”.
After completion of his
guerrillas war course and a re-education course on agrarian reform, he
returned to the South in 1953 bringing with him the directives of Uncle Ho
and a valuable award, an insignia which Uncle gave him for his good study
results. Comrade Le Duc Anh also give him recommendations on his combat
tasks once back in the South.
In 1954, Tran Cong An
was regrouped in the North. He was leader of battalion 1, regiment 656,
division 338 task was to build and train his unit military and politically
so that it could carry out good of offensive and defensive. His battalion
was ranked first in regiment 656. In 1958, he became leader of regiment
656, which was sent to Lac Thung district, Hoa Binh province to organize
production. On 17.02.1961, the general staff appointed him leader of
brigade 1which with 205 officers, was bound for the South. On half way,
with the consent of comrade Tran Nam Trung, Tran Cong An led brigade 1 to
Laos to help our friends liberate Muong Phon and Se Bon posts, which
rejoiced our Laotian friends very much.
On 15.07.1961, he
arrived at the military section of the Central Party Committee in the
South, to which he handed over 205 officers in full, Then Tran Cong An was
appointed deputy leader of brigade U, in charge of production to fulfil
logistics duties, protection of war zone A (war zone). He was also
appointed member of the Party Committee of the regional logistics
department.
At that time, Tran Cong
An was perplex: Should he choose production on combat? Finally, he
remembered Uncle Ho’s words when he was in the North: “all jobs are
glorious for a revolutionary, provided he carried out his job well, then
he is a good communist Party member”. Tran Cong An chose production,
brought his wife and all his children to the war zone to participate in
the revolution. He was at the head of logistics units and built our base
in war zone A (war zone D) named U. The commanders were Dao Son Tay, Tran
Cong An, Nam Dinh and Muoi Bo. After Dao Son Tay had returned to the
regional logistics department, U50 developed only one year the number of
500 officers and soldiers increased to 5000. U50 managed 1,500 ha of land
in the areas of Ma Da, Suoi Dat, Ba Dec, Bau Da. The depending units of
U50 spread up to Dong Xoai, Bu Dang, Ta Lai, Song Be, Bu Khien, Bu Na, Bu
Chap, which was connected with Tay Nguyen base. The second branch started
from Ma Da to Dat spring and Long An… expanded to Tay Ninh, then was
connected with the western region of South Viet Nam.
Under Tran Cong An, U50
produced, protected and managed a grandiose quantity of food. There was in
permanent storage over 1,000 tons of rice. U50 officers and soldiers
emulated to cultivate nearly 1,000 ha of manioc. Tran Cong An and the
brigade command were at the head of a grandiose organization in the
forest, comprising all division: military supplies, military hospital,
military weapons, transportation… The brigade was mainly supported by the
rice from “weak zones” (over which we had little control). Rice was then
transported to the banks of Song Be river by 100 ox cart , a fleet of
trucks, numerous people transporting rice on their bicycle. This rice was
supplied to our troops. In addition to main forces regiments, the brigade
had to provide food to over 20,000 visitors. Over three years, on seven
lines of liaison, U50 logistics brigade supplied enough rice to ensure the
victories of Dong Xoai and Binh Gia campaigns.
U50 was a big scale
production and combat logistics unit located in a vasty base. The enemy
attacked it incessantly, bombarded it day and night and lay in ambush
frequently, but they could not deter our officers and soldiers from
fulfilling their duties. They many times dropped poisonous chemicals on
our cultivations. Tran Cong An had the initiative of cutting off manioc
trunks so that their tubers would not be contaminated by poison. This
initiative was effective, the production did not decrease, on the contrary
200 more hectares were cultivated with manioc.
At the conference
summing up preliminary results obtained by the regional logistics
department in December 1964, comrades Tran Van Tra and Le Duc Anh
recommended the other logistics units in the region to study and adopt
Tran Cong An’s method. And his other name “Hai Ca” (given by his
fellow-combatants) appeared from that date. The 5000 U50 logistics
combatants who carried out their combat and production in many places had
the honour to bear the friendly and warm name “Hai Ca’s army”.
After Binh Gia and Dong
Xoai campaigns, the Party Central Committee in the South and the regional
command party committee judged that USA could send their invading troops
to South Viet Nam. The battle fields in the eastern region of South Viet
Nam, especially in Bien Hoa town, would play an important role. Based on
this judgement, the regional command decided to appoint Hai Ca as head of
Bien Hoa armed forces. Tran Cong An (Hai Ca) assumed officially this
function from February1965. He chose 50 best special mission combatants to
fight on the battle field of Bien Hoa. In his new position, with his
experience of special mission warfare, he consolidated at once the
organization of Bien Hoa town armed forces and at the base, studied the
situation well and drew up a plan to form a belt area to destroy the
Americans when they put their feet on this dear Dong Nai land.
The enemy suffered
heavy defeats with their “special warfare”. In the beginning of May 1965
many USA troops flocked into South Viet Nam. They sent USA parachutist
brigade 173, an Australian battalion and a New Zealander company to Bien
Hoa. They launched at once attacks destined to destroy revolutionary
forces, expanded and upgraded Bien Hoa strategic airport, placed in Bien
Hoa town their commanding machine for combating the revolution in the
region of South Viet Nam: the command of Corps 3 (of the Saigon army),
Police department of the eastern region, the Long Binh general depot, the
USA field command at Long Binh. It was clear that the Americans and the
Saigon troops formed a powerful closed defence system around the eastern
area of their capital Saigon.
In strict
implementation of the 2nd resolution (July 1965) of the Party
central Committee in the South “Ready to combat the enemy in case they
launched a partial war…”, under the command of Tran Man and Tran Cong An,
in the night of 23.08.1965, our forces carried out a second intimidating
attack on their airport in Bien Hoa, destroying 68 planes of all kinds, 8
rocket batteries, 22 fuel tanks, 30 vehicles and killed 3,000 American and
Saigon soldiers. After this battle, Uncle Ho sent a letter of
commendation, the regional command conferred a first class military medal
on all the battle participants and a third class military medal on Tran
Cong An. Bien Hoa town’s role became more and more important. On
05.09.1965, the Party Central Committee in the South decided to form a
battle unit equivalent to a provincial unit named U1 (comprising Bien Hoa
town and Vinh Cuu district) and appointed Tran Cong An as a leader of U1
and Nguyen Van Kien (regional party committee alternate member) as
secretary of U1 provincial party committee.
In his new position
with heavier responsibilities, Tran Cong An made this analysis: “In order
to vanquish the Americans we first just know them well. Although they are
rich and have many weapons, we are not afraid of them. We, the Vietnamese
people, are determined to combat and know how to combat. So, we shall
win”. Animated by this high resolution, in the night of 22.06.1966, Tran
Cong An, leader of the provincial armed forces, personally led two special
mission companies to attack the Long Binh combined depot, using home-made
time mines, destroying over 40,000 tons of USA bombs and shells, limiting
thus the enemy’s destruction power on battle fields. From October to
December 1966, company 2 (U 1 special mission) continued to attack Long
Binh depot three times, destroying hundred thousands of their bombs and
shells. The Government conferred my military medals on U 1 and its
members.
In preparation for 1968
spring campaign, Tran Cong An, leader of U 1 provincial armed forces and
deputy front commander and comrade Phan Van Trang, former secretary of the
provincial party committee and deputy front political adviser and other
comrades well fulfilled their assigned task, which was to bring 250
wounded soldiers out of the enemy’s siege. Although the victory of the
1968 campaign was not complete, we create a decisive turning point in our
national salvation resistance war against the USA invaders, forcing the
USA to decrease their war escalation so that our party and our people
could carry out the teaching of our grandiose Uncle Ho “Combat until the
Americans run away and the treacherous gang is felled” for the total
liberation of the South”.
Just as general Le
Trong Tan (deputy front commander in the South) judged: “Bien Hoa
fulfilled its tasks during the 1968 spring and the 1969 general offensive
and uprising”.
Especially for Tran
Cong An, before participating in the 1969 campaign as a father he faced to
misfortunes happening to his two sons. His eldest son, company leader Tran
Van Cao, 27 years of age, had his right leg wounded then amputated after
he had led a group to make investigations two times at Bien Hoa airport.
His younger son Tran Van Mum, 16 years of age, was killed in an ambush
after he had guided a radio transmission group to the front command
headquarters. As leader of the provincial armed forces in war time Tran
Cong An in prison had assigned those tasks to his children. The sorrows
temporarily alleviated of a father who overcome his sufferings gave place
to an extraordinary energy of a commander on the battle-field. This was
the action of a hero. I was very touched and nearly wept when hearing the
following words of comrade Phan Van Trang, former secretary of U 1
provincial party committee: “Hai Ca’s sacrifice was sublime. All his
family participated in the revolution. Hai Ca never refused any task and
fulfilled it well, however hard it was. What was most pathetic was that he
calmly commanded the battles while his family suffered the death of his
mother, the death of his son and the infirmity of another son. He overcame
all that to win”.
It was impossible to
recount all the brilliant exploits of this hero who commanded combats on
Bien Hoa airport, Long Binh general depot, against mopping-up operations
who clung closely to the population to build revolutionary organizations
at the base. In this writing, I treat in detail only two themes: the man
who invented the special mission warfare in South Viet Nam and who built
logistics bases. In the subsequent years, Tran Cong An was appointed back
to the logistics as commander of brigade 600, which contributed to the
great victory of Ho Chi Minh campaign on this heroic eastern region and on
this Dong Nai territory.
The life of Tran Cong
An, hero of the people’s armed forces, is extremely rich. His combat and
other missions were bright like burning fire in all circumstances. He
seemed to be born for victories, he won a hundred big and small victories,
he also triumphed in his two marches on the Truong Son mountain, he
personally listened to Uncle Ho’s teachings eight times, he won victories
in researches, discovering and inventing the special mission tactics for
the first time in the eastern region of South Viet Nam, he won a victory
when capturing an enemy and weapons with his unarmed hand and his hatred
for the enemy, he won in the logistics domain, he overcome his family
difficulties to fulfil his tasks at the campaign command headquarters and
his greatest victory was to overcome all difficulties, hardships and
dangers to fulfil any duty entrusted by the Party and carry out Uncle Ho’s
teachings in an outstanding manner.
This is easy to
understand because he is a child of the heroic war zone D, grew up on the
traditionally indomitable 300 year-old Bien Hoa-Dong Nai territory which
inherits the heroic 4000 year-old history of our national formation and
defence. This heroism can be seen in the character of this “Uncle Ho’s
soldier”, this “historical glorious veteran”, who, after being retired and
returning to civilian life, has become a good producing peasant on whom
the People’s Committee of Song Be province has conferred a commendation
diploma. Twenty years after the total liberation of the South for nearly
two years after his retirement, Tran Cong An leads a simple life beside
the victory monument at Bien Hoa airport. He remains faithful to his
paralyzed wife, who was also a revolutionary activist.
Children and Youths,
especially the pupils and students of Ngo Quyen, Tran Hung Dao, Trinh Hoai
Duc and Tan Tien school… as well as the residents of Bien Hoa city in
general and of Trung Dung in particular respect old revolutionaries,
families which made contributions to the revolutionary, especially comrade
Hai Ca who is loved intensively by everybody for his simple, sincere,
faithful and peasant manners after he takes off his coat with many
brilliant medals pinned on it, which he wears on the occasion of formal
ceremonies. Talking with me, 80 year-old hero Tran Cong An was anxious: “I
am already old, I can no longer do anything for families of fallen heroes,
old persons, youths and children…”. In reality, colonel Tran Cong An,
after being retired, has devoted a lot of time to provide houses to tens
of persons who made contributions to the revolution, build tens of
gratitude houses and find stable employment for hundreds of people. Most
recently, he built a very beautiful club for old people at block 6, Trung
Dung ward, which costs over a hundred million VND. Nobody forget his
devoted contribution.
It is evident that
COLONEL TRAN CONG AN, HERO OF THE PEOPLE’S ARMED FORCES is a modest
person.